Human dignity is the recognition and respect of human need, desire and expectation one individual by another. This recognition is indispensable because no human being survives alone: Human dignity creates the foundation of society and civilization. Our knowledge of history suggests that religious ideas have provided this basic foundation of civilization. Describing the first recognized civilization in history one historian says, "Religion permeated Sumerian civic life."
1 According to another historian, "Religion dominated, suffused, and inspired all features of Near Eastern society-law, kingship, art, and science." 2 Based on these observations while defining civilization Samuel Huntington asserts, "Religion is a central defining characteristic of civilizations." 3 In Islam, the Qur'an declares that: "We have bestowed dignity on the progeny of Adam." The verse then continues to remind the whole of mankind of God's special favor unto them with physical and intellectual abilities, natural resources and with superiority over most other creatures in the world. 4 This dignity is bestowed through God's act of creating Adam and breathing into him His Own Spirit. 5 Since all human beings originated from Adam and his spouse, 6 every single human being possesses this dignity regardless of color, race, religion and tribe. The whole of mankind, as khalīfah (vice-regent) 7 is responsible for establishing peace on earth through divinely ordained values such as amānah (trust), 'adālah (justice) and shūra (consultation). 8 Islamic civilization began to translate these values of human dignity into history under the leadership Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) in seventh-century Arabia. The Qur'an refers to this change in history as a divine sign of God's guidance for mankind. 9 Muslims developed sharī'ah (principles for policy making) for guidance in economic, environmental, legal, political and social features of life in order to preserve and promote life, religion, reason, progeny and wealth. These features combined to create a glorious civilization: Islamic civilization prospered and flourished for many centuries. 10 However, this civilization began to suffer and decline when Muslims deviated from these values. 11 The situation in Muslim communities deteriorated further during the two centuries of European colonial occupation followed by a period of nationalist fervor in the twentieth century. 12 In response reformers and leaders came forward to reorganize and reconstruct the society to revive values of human dignity. 13 Islamic values were re-interpreted and presented in comparison with Western values.
14 Human rights based on the Qur'anic ideal of human dignity have gained further significance in contemporary times as independent Muslim-majority nation-states established political institutions to secure Muslim interests. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)-an international intergovernmental Islamic political institution representing all Muslim majority nation states 15 -adopted the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights (CDHR) at a meeting held in Cairo. The charge of the CDHR is to "serve as a guide for member states on human rights issues." 16 All men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the basis of race, colour, language, belief, sex, religion, political affiliation, social status or other considerations. True religion is the guarantee for enhancing such dignity along the path to human integrity.
17
This paper examines the success of this declaration in guiding and ensuring human dignity and rights in these countries and questions how successfully the OIC has put this declaration into practice. This paper also examines whether the Qur'anic values of human dignity have the potential to play any role in rescuing the contemporary Muslim community from its declining state of affairs or whether these ideas about human rights could contribute to avoiding the catastrophic clash of civilizations scenario in the twenty-first century.
The OIC Charter declared member countries' determination to consolidate the prevailing brotherly and spiritual friendship of their citizens, and protect their freedom and the common legacy of their civilization founded on the principles of justice, toleration, and nondiscrimination. 18 In the Charter's preamble, 19 members pledged to endeavor to increase human well-being, progress and freedom everywhere; and they resolved to unite their efforts in order to secure universal peace, security, freedom, and justice for their people and all people throughout the world. 20 The Charter recognized the importance of human dignity and rights, and noted in the Preamble that its member states "reaffirming their commitment to the U.N. Charter and fundamental Human Rights, the purpose and principles of which provide the basis for fruitful cooperation amongst all people." 21 The OIC has also made references to the UN Charter and UDHR 22 in resolutions related to the rights of Muslim minorities living in non-member countries. 23 In one of its early resolutions, the OIC appealed to "countries with Muslim minorities to respect those minorities and their 17 However, in 1990 the OIC signed its own "Cairo Declaration on Human Rights (CDHR) in Islam." 25 We shall consider why the OIC needed CDHR given the UDHR.
After the promulgation of the UDHR in 1948, the question of human rights began to receive attention in the Muslim world. Some independent Muslim countries had already come into existence and become members of the United Nations.
26
When the UN General Assembly enacted the UDHR, two Muslim countries, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, took opposite stands on the issue: Pakistan strongly endorsed the document, while Saudi Arabia refused to sign, arguing that Islamic sharī'ah had already adequately recognized the rights of men and women in Islam: thus the signing of UDHR was unnecessary.
27
With the passage of time, theoretical discussion and argument on the question and its practical implications received more attention. One human rights academician has rightly pointed out that,
The issue of the relationship between the Islamic legal tradition and human rights, which is of great theoretical interest, has gained in practical significance in the wake of the Islamic resurgence that began after the Arab- to "serve as a guide for member states on human rights issues." 30 The document stated that fundamental human dignity and universal freedom of the individual in Islam were an integral part of the Islamic religion and no one as a matter of principle had the right to violate, suspend or even ignore them. CDHR was patterned after the UN-sponsored UDHR of 1948, but it also frequently refers to the Qur'an, the prophetic teachings, and the Islamic legal tradition as sources of inspiration. The references to these Islamic sources of law are significant. 31 Because of them, one could argue that there are fundamental differences between the two declarations.
One may obviously find a significant difference on the issue of the extent of individual's freedom of choice. While the UDHR stands for absolute freedom of individual choice, the Qur'an advocates certain fundamental values. Islamic sharī'ah, for example, doesn't permit enacting laws to allow sexual relations outside the institution of marriage, or allow marriage between two members of the same sex. The HRW also reports every year about discrimination in Muslim countries on these issues, yet any observer of political developments in Muslim countries would agree that these are not fundamental problems of human rights violations in Muslim countries.
32 This is because the demands for gay rights and the right of consensual sex outside of marriage are not popular demands in Muslim countries. 33 The main predicament related to the issue of human rights in Muslim countries, like many other countries in the world, is individual freedom of speech and political opinion.
34
The suppression of political opinion was seen as a natural occurrence under colonial rule.
35
It did not emerge as a significant problem even during the early days of the independent nation-state system mainly because immediately after independence, Muslim patriotic fervor ran high and most people wanted to see their newly independent states strong and stable. Thus, they were generally willing 30 Slowly this consciousness grew and political opinions began to be more crystallized in other Arab and Muslim countries. 39 But as human rights activists grew more energetic, these countries' ruling regimes increased political repression. Interestingly, during this same period, these countries were also trying to build consensus on a declaration on human rights. One cannot help but question why they pursued such a blatant contradictory policy. These conflicting policies seem to have contributed to the rise of intimidation and terrorism in the Muslim world today. This author has selected Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and 40 In 1965 the democratic process suffered its first setback when the Minister of Defense staged a military coup against the nationalist leadership and introduced a one-party system with a socialist orientation. Soon the oneparty system created a wide gap between the ruling elite and the masses. By the late 1970s, 41 protests against the socialist orientation of the government gained momentum, and demands were made in favor of a multi-party system. Mustafa Bouyali-a veteran of the war of independence-established an underground organization in 1982 in response to government's suppressive measures. 42 However, in the early years of 1980s two prominent Muslim sheikhs 'Abdul Latif Sultani and Ahmad Sahnoun raised their voices against the government's socialist and Europeanized secular tendencies. Although Bouyali's movement acted within the legal framework, the protest gatherings in support of the sheikh's demands at the University of Algiers were met with arrests and persecution. 43 By October 1988, the economic condition of the country deteriorated sharply. In 1989 the government responded by drafting a new constitution in which socialism was dropped as the state ideology and political parties were allowed to function. 44 In 1990 the government decided to hold provincial and municipal elections in which multiple 40 46 The FIS secured thirty-two of the forty-eight regional councils. The military, which had developed vested interests by controlling power for almost three decades, seemed to have become extremely worried: they intervened in the political process by postponing the general elections, which were due in 1992. The authorities also banned the FIS and its leaders from participating in politics. They banned demonstrations and gatherings using a state of emergency decree. 47 Soon Algeria plunged into a chaotic situation. AI's annual report of 1994 recorded that the government had cracked down on Islamist activists, who came mainly from the supporters of FIS. The government enacted new laws to legitimize its actions: In September 1992 the security forces were granted special powers to arrest and try suspected Islamist activists on terrorism charges. But these trials generally violated international trial standards. According to AI, "secret and accelerated trials . . . extended the scope of the death penalty, doubled sentences for terrorist offences and lowered the age of criminal responsibility in such cases to 16 years." 48 The authorities' response suggests that they were only interested in eliminating political opponents. The government claimed to have acted to maintain law and order in the country but apparently not in good faith or in a democratic manner as this was evidenced in the authorities' attitude toward FIS. In order to neutralize the situation when FIS responded by condemning violence through its spokespersons in exile, the authorities did not respond positively.
Within months, a small group called Groupe Islamique Arme or GIA, allegedly drawn from among the supporters of the FIS, stepped up an armed opposition to the government. Immediately the level of violence increased. Reports of brutal massacres in various parts of the country became a common feature in the press. 49 However, some rightist groups have cast doubts on whether all the killings were really conducted by GIA or any other similar groups. 50 In order to legitimatize their actions against those who once supported FIS, the security forces conducted themselves in a way so they could construct evidence against the FIS. The HRW reported in 1999:
The succession of massacres between August 1997 and January 1998 were concentrated near the heavily militarized outskirts of Algiers and in the province of Relizane near the western oil port of Arzew. The precinct of Beni Massous on the outskirts of Algiers, where about eighty persons were killed, according to press reports, on September 5, 1997, was virtually surrounded by military installations. Survivors told Algerian reporters the day after the Chouardia massacre that even though a paramilitary gendarme post was located only one kilometer away, security forces did not arrive until four and one-half hours after the killing ended.
51
The same report described a number of other incidents casting doubts about the role of government forces in the reported massacres.
52
AI also reported similar incidents.
53 AI noted in its annual report of 2002 that the security forces "neutralized" twenty thousand "terrorists" since 1992. 54 It also reported that, "[h]undreds of civilians were killed by armed groups which define[d] themselves as 'Islamic groups' in both targeted attacks and indiscriminate bomb explosions." 55 Furthermore, no action was taken by the authorities to clarify the fate of some four thousand men and women who "disappeared" after arrest by members of the security forces or state armed militias since 1993.
56
Non-governmental organizations continued to report thousands of cases of extrajudicial executions, deliberate and arbitrary killings of civilians, torture and ill treatment, and "disappearances." 57 Some members of the security forces and militias were reportedly tried and North Africa, Algeria (available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k2/mena1.html) (stating in its 2002 Annual Report that, "Attribution was often difficult because the assailants usually fled without being apprehended and rarely claimed responsibility or explained their motives.") (accessed Mar. 12, 2009 In 2000 the Group sought permission to visit Algeria to conduct investigations on these reports, but the authorities refused to entertain the request.
60 AI recorded that:
Long standing requests by the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and the UN Rapporteur on torture to visit Algeria had not resulted in invitations (by the government) by the end of the year.
61
Reports produced by Amnesty International are generally very clear about the state of affairs on the lack of individual rights to freedom of expression.
The authorities conveniently accused the political opposition of being terrorists, partially because of the violent method adopted by some opponents of the government. 62 The government does not seem to have left dissidents with any peaceful means of expressing opposing views. 63 This, of course, does not justify the violent method in which some opponents of the government have reacted, for Islamic teachings on human life and dignity highlighted by CDHR do not approve any form of indiscriminate killing of civilians. 64 One might, indeed, conclude that the authorities are also equally, if not more, responsible for the rise of violence in the country.
Thus, the most disturbing element of these developments is the cases of disappearance. The 2002 report of Amnesty International recorded that, "no steps were known to have been taken to investigate information provided by families about the alleged burial place of relatives who had been abducted and killed by armed groups. 
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responsible for the growth of militancy among the people especially when the criminal activities occurred while its leaders were under arrest and the party was officially banned. It is noteworthy that because of the UN's commitment to UDHR the UN Group attempted to intervene in response to reports on human rights violations.
66 But CDHR also declares that, "Life is a God-given gift and the right to life is guaranteed to every human being . . . it is prohibited to take away life except for a sharī'ah prescribed reason." 67 It is doubtful that sharī'ah would have approved acts of torture, disappearances, and detention without trial. 68 However, the OIC never raised any such question with the Algerian authorities. The Islamic Jurisprudence Academy 69 also never initiated any public discussion on this subject.
The events of September 11, 2001 provided the Algerian authorities with fresh opportunities to go on the offensive against their opponents. In 2002 Algeria hosted three international meetings relating to "counter-terrorism" and "organized criminality." Terrorism. 72 AI criticized Algeria's "counter-terrorism" approach as a pretext to justify mass human rights violations, but the U.S. government publicly declared its support for Algeria's "counter-terrorism" policy. 73 Thus, it is likely that the people chose FIS over FLN because of corruption, lack of accountability and transparency, and also suppression of challenging voices within FLN. FLN, which was dominated by the military, had developed vested interests and did not want to compromise in controlling political power. FLN had introduced a one-party system not because the leaders liked the socialist idea of equality, but because they did not want their power to be challenged. One questions why were they scared of the FIS. A fundamental question arises here as to why the military government acted so desperately to deny the FIS from grabbing political power. The only explanation possible is that the military had grown to enjoy vested interests under years of FLN rule in Algeria. In fact, the government tried to stop any Islamic-oriented party in the political process of the country from surfacing, and yet FIS emerged as victorious in the elections. According to human rights activist and political scientist Chandra Muzaffar:
Everything was stacked against the Islamic party. The FLN changed important rules of electoral competition to hobble the FIS. The entire state machinery was mobilized to the maximum to ensure a FLN victory. A massive propaganda drive was launched to tarnish the image of its main opponent. The FLN went all out to discredit the FIS's successes in the various municipalities that it controlled following municipal elections of 1990.
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In reality, however, the same author observes: [t] he FIS, from all accounts, had improved the administration of its municipalities, delivered essential services to the poor with a degree of efficiency and checked rampant corruption and abuse of power. Its achievements at the municipal level were one of the reasons for the FIS's outstanding performance in the national election. 
The government's decision to recognize and strike a deal with Israel independently of the Palestinians and other Arab countries violated the country's earlier commitment to the OIC. 87 The authorities kept this issue out of any public debate by declaring Emergency Rule in the country. On its part, the Muslim Brotherhood, apparently in an attempt to avoid any direct confrontation with the authorities, confined their opposition to passive criticism of the government. 88 However, this new approach seemed too passive for some radical supporters and sympathizers of the movement. During the final years of Sadat's rule, new groups such as Jihad, the Takfir wa al-Hijrah and Shabab alMuhammad emerged with a militant approach for political change in the country.
89
The government responded with increased repressive measures: President Hosni Mubarak, successor to Anwar al-Sadat, is reported to have said, "I refuse to allow human rights to become a slogan to protect terrorists." 90 However, with the passage of time, this created extreme tension between the government and some political activists. AI in its 1994 report recorded that: In fact Egypt has been under Emergency Rule under President Hosni Mubarak since 1979 and when presidential elections, a single candidate, the president himself received ninety-seven or ninety-eight percent of the total vote cast. In parliamentary elections, the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) has maintained control of the 454-seat People's Assembly.
The government not only ensured victory in the elections for the party in power, it also adopted repressive measures to quell rising opposition voices in the country. 92 In its 1994 report, AI noted that hundreds of suspected supporters of banned Islamist groups were arrested and tortured. 93 The authorities refused to reveal the details of arrests and detentions: over two thousand people were believed to have been held under emergency legislation. 94 The report stated that hundreds of civilians were charged with membership in militant Islamist groups and many were accused of violent political offences. Their cases were referred to military courts by the order of President Mubarak 95 himself. However, AI's report also noted that [t] he procedures of military courts fell far short of international fair trial standards: the judges, military officers, were not independent, and defendants were denied adequate time to prepare their defence and had no right to appeal . . . and (many were) tortured to extract confessions.
96
The CDHR declares that, "Safety from bodily harm is a guaranteed right (of the individual). It is the duty of the state to safeguard it, and it is prohibited to breach it without a Sharī'ah-prescribed reason. 
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under international human rights law. 102 Many have been detained for mere membership in the Society of Muslim Brotherhood and for possessing leaflets which the security agencies considered opposed to the regime. 103 It is noteworthy that the authorities have occasionally attempted to convince the international community that the so-called Islamic "militants" have posed a serious threat to internal law and order, thus justifying their severe treatment. The HRW report noted that,
[s]enior government officials repeatedly emphasized to the international community the threat posed by Egyptian militants based abroad, seeking their extradition and even extra-legal return, but remained unresponsive publicly to calls from militant and moderate Islamists inside Egypt for a halt to politically motivated violence.
104
Despite regular reports of serious human rights violations in the following years by national and international human rights organizations, there has been no change in the government's attitude.
The reports indicate how the Egyptian government has been violating democratic norms, international law and agreements and protocols as well as persecution. However, neither the OIC nor any other international Islamic organization or institution has pointed out how the Egyptian government was violating the teachings of sharī'ah elucidated by CDHR while conducting operations against the so-called Islamists.
SAUDI ARABIA
The geographical areas that constitute Saudi Arabia today had been under the peripheral rule of the Osmanli (Ottoman) state until early in the twentieth century, and the sharī'ah has been the main framework for law in the area since seventh century C.E. In 1932 Abdulaziz, popularly known as ibn Sa'ud, (1876 Sa'ud, ( -1953 established the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and declared sharī'ah as the main framework for law in the country. 105 Ibn Sa'ud is reported to have regularly consulted the tribal chiefs and religious scholars. He also allowed the common people to reach him without restrictions and formalities. One academician, perhaps not exaggerating, romanticized the system as a "real and practical expression of the general will" of Rousseau. 106 This was an interesting development, for similar demands were also put forward by many Western critics of the country. 110 In 1994 Saudi Arabia appointed a sixty-member consultative council as a part of a series of reforms announced. Yet, questions remained about how the members of the consultative council were appointed, i.e., whether they were appointed by the king or elected by the people. In the absence of the traditional pattern of direct access to the king and the policy-makers, this council could have played a mediating role between the government and the people. However, this was not to be the case when a number of Saudi intellectuals formed the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) in the same year with the aim of "alleviating injustice, . . . [and] defence of human rights decided by the sharī'ah."
111
The highest religious authority of the country came out with a statement that "the country had no need for human rights organizations since it was ruled in accordance with the Sharī'ah." 112 The CDLR attempted to combine Islamic and Western tradition of people's participation in the political process but the government suppressed it by citing security reasons. 
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The government's action raises the question whether the Sharī'ah authorizes such groups as CDLR, since it implied that only government officials have power to do so. But that is not how Islamic Qur'anic teachings have been understood during the early centuries of Islam. Remember CDHR has declared that, "[e]very human being has the right to enjoy a legitimate eligibility with all its prerogatives and obligations."
114 CDLR supporters claimed to have established the NGO in order to fulfill their obligations recommended in the sharī'ah. According to the AI, the authorities have since harassed not only the officials of CDLR but also their relatives and associates. 115 Citizens have been arrested and detained indefinitely without charge or trial. Allegations of human rights violations were rarely heard under the rules of King Abdulaziz ibn Sa'ud or King Faisal.
In the following years, human rights organizations have reported numerous rights violations. In its 1997 annual report, the government's action raises the question whether the sharī'ah funded such groups as CDLR, implying that any government officials have power to do so. AI recorded many allegations of torture and ill treatment of political and criminal detainees. 116 One report included stories of beatings, the use of shackles and threats of sexual assault. 117 One prisoner was reportedly severely beaten while handcuffed and shackled with his arms and legs tied together behind his back. He was also reportedly kept in solitary confinement in an underground cell for over a year. 118 The detainees included relatives of CDLR activists living in exile, shi'ah scholars and activists, and the so-called Afghan-Bosnia veterans. 119 The report also related stories about injustices met by foreign Muslim and non-Muslim nationals. volunteers who went to fight against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, and to Bosnia to support oppressed Muslims against Serbian aggression in the early 1990s. These soldiers were not only motivated to resist Soviet and Serbian domination of Muslims; they were equally concerned about the U.S. involvement in Muslim affairs in general and Saudi affairs in particular. Ironically, the Saudi government also has always been strongly opposed to any foreign intervention into Muslim affairs in general and in Saudi affairs in particular.
In 1978 when the Egyptian government planned to establish relations with Israel independently of other Muslim countries, and the OIC resolved to sever diplomatic relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia actively participated in adopting a resolution not to allow the presence of foreign troops in any Muslim country. 121 However, within years, Saudi Arabia allowed U.S. troops to be stationed on its soil during the first Iraq war in 1990-91. In the view of many Saudis, this action was against the interest of the ummah. According to one author,
The decision to place U.S and other Western troops on Islam's sacred soil, there to unleash them against another Muslim country (Iraq) was deeply unsettling to many Saudis and aroused strong opposition in young fundamentalists.
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Since there was no formal mechanism to express their opinion, the veterans took up the language of arms to express their opposition to such moves as they were trained to do in Afghanistan and Bosnia, thus creating a direct confrontation between the veterans and the government. These actions were taken despite the fact that the Qur'an clearly guides believers not to differentiate between words and deeds (61:2), and clearly censures arrest, detention without charge, and beating up of prisoners unless proven guilty. However, these human rights reports suggest that Saudi Arabia seems to have ignored its commitment not only to the sharī'ah, but also to UN Conventions.
In The document also states that, "[t]o AI's knowledge, he and other political detainees were not charged with any recognizably criminal offence and were denied the right to challenge the legality of their detention." 125 The 2003 Annual Report records that a professor of alIhsa University was arrested after he participated in a demonstration protesting against Israeli atrocities in Palestine. 126 It also reported that
In July Sa'id bin Sa'id Zuba'ir, aged 28, was arrested at Riyadh airport. He was apparently planning to travel to Qatar to be interviewed by al-Jazeera television in order to raise awareness of his father's detention in Saudi Arabia.
127
His father, Sa'id bin Zuba'ir had been detained without charge or trial since his arrest in 1995. 128 The 2003 report of the AI also recorded that,
In May the UN Committee against Torture examined Saudi Arabia's implementation of the UN Convention against Torture and urged it to bring legislation and practice into line with the letter and spirit of the Convention.
129
Now having shown how Egypt and Saudi Arabia were in the vanguard in adopting CDHR, we turn our analysis toward Turkey as an example of a country adopting values of both Islamic and Western civilizations. Turkey institutionalized a democratic process in which political parties were allowed to participate. However, the Turkish armed forces remained vigilant in "safeguarding" democracy and secularism in the country. 130 Soon they developed vested interests in politics, and the armed forces intervened at least three times (1960, 1971, and 1980 ) to save what they called Kemalism (the six principles of Mustafa Kamal, the founder of the Republic). 131 Each time the military patronized political parties that favored the armed forces. 132 In 1997 the armed forces again intervened to overthrow the democratically elected government in order to install privileged parties and candidates. 133 These interventions resulted in a wide gap between the military elite and politicians patronized by the military on one hand and the common people on the other. These interventions also caused human rights abuses. HRW and AI annual reports have condemned Turkey for offenses similar to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The authorities then blamed mainly the Kurdish separatists, socialist extremists, and the Islamist parties for acting against "the state" and the "state ideology." As in Algeria and Egypt, Turkish human rights organizations reported indiscriminate arrests, disappearances and extra judicial killings. 135 The same document also reported extrajudicial executions.
136
The 1997 annual report of the organization noted that, "There were frequent welldocumented reports of torture by police and gendarmes . . . at least eleven people died in custody apparently as a result of torture." 137 Having completed the in depth analysis of several key countries in balancing sharī'ah, Islamic and Western concepts, we now discuss this question of law and religion in society in the context of the political atmosphere in the Muslim world.
SHARĪ'AH AND LAW IN THE MUSLIM WORLD
It is noteworthy that CDHR makes frequent reference to sharī'ah but ignores teachings of sharī'ah when its member countries repress citizens using torture, and imprisonment without trial and disappearance. Violations of sharī'ah and human rights have become very common in many OIC countries in recent years. This seems to indicate the common people are increasingly seeking guidance for good governance in religious ideas, as well as that OIC governments are desperately trying to pacify the people by declaring their commitment to sharī'ah. 144 However, this Machiavellian attempt is turning out to be catastrophic in the Muslim world. Let us first consider the case of Saudi Arabia, the country that is most vocal about the rule of sharī'ah. When the government proclaimed a reform of the political system of the country and announced the formation of a consultative council, some Saudi intellectuals formed CDLR to defend human rights in the light of the sharī'ah, but the authorities crushed them.
145
The Qur'an not only guides the believers not to discriminate between words and deeds, it also says that, "Most loathsome is it in the sight of God that you say what you do not do."
146 And yet "the council of senior 'Ulama-the highest religious authority in the kingdom-stated that the country had no need for human rights organizations since it was ruled in accordance with the Sharī'ah."
147 Now the question is how the sharī'ah will determine who is right-CDLR activists or the Council of senior 'ulama. The sharī'ah neither prohibits nor requires the formation of a political party, trade union or a rights group. But the Qur'an strongly recommends the believers to consult among themselves on their affairs. 148 Should the consultation be in the manifestation of political parties or trade unions or rights groups? The Qur'an seems to have left the followers to develop mechanisms for consultation. However, the government decision to consult only those who would be loyal to the government seems to clearly violate the Qur'anic principles. In fact Muslim scholars throughout history have almost unanimously opposed tyrannical regimes on the one hand and terror campaigns against an established government on the other. The scholars were generally fearful of abuse of human rights and human dignity under anarchic rule.
Examples of consultation between the ruler and the ruled under King Abdulaziz ibn Sa'ud are plentiful. On many occasions tribal and religious leaders challenged the king. For example, this happened when Saudi Arabia introduced technological innovations such as the radio, telephone and telegraph in the country. On every occasion, Abdulaziz convened a public debate to discuss the issue with opponents. He always supported his arguments by quoting the Qur'an, the prophetic tradition or events from Muslim history, and persuaded his opponents to follow his policies. 149 Abdulaziz went through very difficult times in the 1920s while he was persuading the nomadic tribes known as Ikhwan warriors to settle down in designated areas of the country. Occasionally he used force, 150 but generally he did not lose touch with the tribal and religious leaders. The situation under King Fahad turned out very differently: authorities hardly had any public debate or consultation on issues such as whether the formation of CDLR was permissible from the Islamic perspective.
The most disturbing issue for the Saudi society is the presence of U.S. troops in the kingdom. One Saudi dissident, Saad al-Fagih, who directs the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia from exile, has pointed that, "after the 1990 Gulf crisis, the U.S. crossed the psychological barrier by bringing in their forces. They failed to remember the sensitivities. Worse, the Saudi government was never brave enough to remind them." 151 This would not have happened under the rule of Abdulaziz. 152 In 1946 when President Truman appealed to the British Mandate Authorities in Palestine to admit 100,000 more Jews to Palestine, Abdulaziz Ibn Saud not only strongly objected to the President, he also made his opinion public by publishing his letter to the American press. 153 This decision protected his legitimacy in the sight of his people. But, as pointed out by Saad al-Fagih, in his article in The Guardian, King Fahad did not seem to have the courage to convey this public feeling about stationing U.S. troops in the country to the U.S. administration. 154 This inability to represent public opinion is one of the fundamental causes for the growth of terrorism in the Muslim world today. But we must equally ask if the terrorists are sincere about their claims. Many activists in the Muslim world today view terrorism as an expression of patriotism. Discussing the current situation in Saudi Arabia, Al-Fagih warns:
the loyalty of the security forces is now seriously in doubt. The regime knows that Osama bin Laden is very popular in the country (a classified US report of a Saudi intelligence survey of educated Saudis between the ages of 25 and 41 in October [2001] found that 95% supported Bin Laden's cause). Any pressure on the security forces to "do their job" would backfire.
155
This resistance is a major problem not only for Saudi Arabia, but also for many countries in the Muslim world today. 156 A huge gap has been created between the people and the ruling elite all over the Muslim world. It is interesting to note that although such an awareness of human rights among Muslim intellectuals did not occur as a direct response to any external challenge, many tradition-oriented and proestablishment Muslim scholars continued to apologetically defend their position, as saying:
Human rights may be something new for the West, but we in Islam have had it since the beginning. We have no differences between whites, blacks, Jews, Muslims-everyone is free. This question has not only fueled the clash of civilizations thesis, it has created a huge tension in the Muslim world today. An enormous gap-a lack of trust, amānah-between the citizens and authorities in most Muslim countries has been created because of the inconsistency between what the leaders claim to stand for and their performance.
158
The Qur'anic values of justice ('adālah) and consultation (shūra) are almost totally missing in most Muslim countries. In our opinion, cultivation of these values will be necessary for holding back declining civilizations or reviving lost civilizations. One point must be made clear: the revival of the values of Islamic civilization must not be perceived as a threat to other existing civilizations in the world today. These values are supposed to be universal and do not favor or discriminate against any ethnic, religious or linguistic community. However, the fundamental question is how one cultivates these values in our contemporary times. We shall briefly present several opinions on this issue.
"Reform" is a very common term in Muslim intellectual history. Any student of history will find a prominent role of reformers in many centuries of Muslim history. Ideas of reform have become even more frequent since the nineteenth century. "'Arab reform' has turned into a catchphrase [,] " says an author in article published in the Egyptian paper Al-Ahram. 159 He questions what kind of reform the Arabs and Muslims should initiate for their societies. 160 The late Edward Said believed that the "Arabs must throw off their shackles," referring to the legacy of European colonialism in the Muslim world. 161 Cheryl Benard, a 157. Dwyer, Arab Voices, supra n. 11, at 38 (quoting from the interview of a member of Morocco's Council of Religious Scholars, Muhammad Mekki Naciri).
158. In other words mere declaring but not following the principles of the sharī'ah in CDHR will be extremely counter-productive. CDHR needs to develop legal mechanisms to ensure human dignity and human rights in practice. In our contemporary times, in an era of the clash of civilizations, what Muslims in general and the OIC in particular need is to practice what they stand for, not just to construct resolutions and declarations such as the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights.
